The article presents a multidimensional analysis of inequality, in a global perspective, distinguishing vital, existential, and material resources inequality. These dimensions are interrelated and interacting, but irreducible to each other, and have had different historical trajectories, within and between nations. Over the last half-century, the contrast between advances of existential equalization, on one hand, and persistent, even increasing, vital inequality of life expectancy and health is striking. Inequalities are produced by specific mechanisms, of which distanciation, exclusion, hierarchization, and exploitation are the most important. They have each their corresponding mechanism of equality, of rapprochement or approximation, of inclusion, of organizational flattening or de-hierarchization, and of redistribution, rehabilitation, and recompensation. The mechanisms and their results are illustrated empirically in a systematic global overview.
with men, or of black working-class boys as compared with white bankers' boys have come to be seen as inequalities. Thus, inequalities are avoidable, morally unjustified, hierarchical differences.
There are at least three fundamentally different kinds of inequality, and they are all destructive of human lives and societies. There is inequality of health and death, which we may call vital inequality. True, we are all mortal and physically vulnerable, and in some sense our life-tree is decided by some inscrutable lottery. However, hard evidence is piling up that health and longevity are distributed with a clearly visible social regularity. Children in poor countries and poor classes die more frequently before the ages of 1 and 5 than children in rich countries and rich classes. Low-status people in Britain die more frequently before retirement age and, if they survive, have shorter lives of retirement than high-status people. A British, male former bank or insurance employee, for instance, has seven to eight more years of retirement life than a former employee of Whitbread or Tesco (1) . Vital inequality, which we can measure most easily by life expectancy and survival rates, is literally destroying millions of lives in the world every year.
Existential inequality restricts freedom of action for certain categories of people, such as women in public spaces and spheres in Victorian and Edwardian Britain and in many Asian, African, and even Southern European countries today. Existential inequality means denial of equal recognition and respect and is a potent source of humiliations of blacks, Amerindians, women in patriarchal societies, poor immigrants, low castes, and stigmatized ethnic groups. But existential inequality is not only blatant discrimination. As we shall see below, it also operates effectively through subtle status hierarchies.
Third, there is resource or material inequality, meaning that humans have very different resources to draw upon. One aspect is access, to education, career tracks, social contacts, and "social capital." In conventional mainstream discussions, this aspect is often described as "inequality of opportunity." Second, there is inequality of rewards, often described as inequality of outcome. This is the most frequently used measure of inequality: the distribution of income and sometimes of wealth.
The three kinds of inequality interact with and influence each other. But they should be distinguished because they have different effects. They also have different trajectories in modern times, which means they are governed by different causal mechanisms.
THE PRODUCTION OF INEQUALITY
Inequality can be produced in four ways. Distantiation means that some people are running ahead while others are falling behind. In exclusion, a barrier has been erected that makes it impossible or at least difficult for certain groups to access a good life. Hierarchization means that societies and organizations are constituted as ladders, with some people perched on top and others below.
Finally, there is exploitation, in which the rich and privileged obtain their rewards from the toil and subjection of the poor and disadvantaged.
The historical importance of these mechanisms in generating the configuration of the modern world is still hotly disputed. Was it primarily a product of North Atlantic nations forging ahead, by scientific and industrial innovations? Was it rather an effect of exclusion, for example, the British rule of India hindering the development of Indian industry? Did the "modern world system" after 1500 spawn a world hierarchy of a core, semi-periphery, and periphery? Or was the rise of the West driven by armed exploitation, by the plunder of American metals, by plantation slavery, and by forced and underpaid commodity production in the South? The debate remains unfinished, both because of the ambiguity of the evidencethere is empirical support for all four mechanisms, but how to weigh them in relation to each other?-and because of the high moral and historical stakes involved.
In this context, however, we shall look into how recent inequalities have been produced. How much is due to exploitation? Vital inequality is not driven by exploitation directly; the health of the healthy is not based upon the disease and death of others. There is a path from the exploitation of workers in risky and unhealthy jobs for profit to inequality of health and life expectancy. Mining in South Africa, China, and the Ukraine and factory work in Special Economic Zones all over the world are notorious. But that is a small part of the picture. Chinese men have the same life expectancy as Poles and live eight years longer than less industrialized Indians.
The widespread West Asian notion, very strong in Chechnya, Kurdistan, and Afghanistan, that a man's honor depends on the subordination and seclusion of his sisters, his wife (or wives), and his mother is a form of existential exploitation. But exploitative patriarchy has been on radical retreat in the world as a whole in the last three decades, even if occasionally hitting back, as in Afghanistan from the anti-Communist jihad in the l980s and later.
If one is not convinced of the labor theory of value, it is difficult to say how much economic inequality is due to capitalist exploitation. The recent, drastic increase of income inequality in China, now much larger than in India or Russia, is clearly due in large part to capitalist use of cheap labor. But the increasing gap between Africa and the rest of the world is not caused by increasing exploitation of Africa. Nor can the widening gap between rich and poor in the United States and the United Kingdom be explained mainly by an increasing exploitation of workers, although the United States' massive influx of cheap immigrant labor has created a polarized labor market and the return of a servants' class, or a "service class" serving a "creative class" (2) and attacks on the unions have pushed down the share of labor.
Summing up, exploitation, the most repulsive generator of inequality, is a significant feature of today's world, but it is not the major force.
Hierarchies have been objects of attack by management gurus for quite some time, and many organizations have been flattened. Historically, the rights of subordinates have been strengthened, including rights of collective representation, in continental European public and private management and more widely in educational establishments. But the countervailing powers of trade unions are generally declining.
Even when organizational pyramids are flattened, however, organizations and societies at large are permeated by subtle hierarchies of social status. Through their unequal allocation of recognition and respect, through their different degrees of freedom to act, and through their effects of hierarchies of self-respect and selfconfidence, these social status hierarchies appear to be a major reason behind persistent inequalities of health and life expectancy. Social hierarchies produce existential inequality which, in turn, has serious psychosomatic consequences.
While there was substantial income equalization in developed countries, including the United Kingdom, in the 20th century, class differentials of life expectancy have widened, particularly among men. In 1910-1912, an unskilled manual worker in England or Wales had a 61% higher risk of dying between the ages of 20 and 44 than a professional man. From 1991 to 1993, the higher risk of early adult death rose to 186%. For a semiskilled worker, the higher mortality risk was 6% before World War I and 76% in the early 1990s (3). The hardest and heaviest evidence for the lethal effects of status hierarchies is probably Sir Michael Marmot's study of 18,000 Whitehall civil servants in the decades following 1967. The risk of early death closely followed the office hierarchy. When age, smoking, blood pressure, cholesterol concentration, and other factors were controlled for, those at the bottom died from coronary heart disease 50% more often than those at the top, during the 25 years of study (4) .
Generally, barriers of exclusion have been lowered in the world, including the exclusion of women from public space, labor markets, and career ladders. Racism has become universally discredited, with important milestones including the dismantling of South African apartheid and the elections of a Dalit (ex-untouchable) state Prime Minister in India and an African-American president in the United States. "First Nations" of the Americas are finally being included into national polities and recently have obtained their democratically deserved central place in Bolivia. The late 20th-century return to the mass migration seen a century ago also means more inclusion.
In China and India, the regaining of national sovereignty after World War II ended their exclusion from development possibilities. Between 1913 and 1950, the rate of economic growth in China and India was about zero. But between 1950 and 1973, Chinese growth was 4.9% a year and India's was 3.5% (5) . In recent decades, access to the U.S. market has been a major engine of East Asian growth and of global equalization.
Though reduced, exclusion remains a major feature of the contemporary world, which is divided into exclusive nation-states, each with specific rights for citizens only. Other excluding processes at work include American cotton protectionism, which hits poor countries of the African savannah. In the current crisis, beneath the taboo on "protectionism," national exclusivism is becoming more marked, as "British jobs for British workers" and "Buy American."
THE PARADOX OF DISTANCE
Finally, there is the mechanism of distantiation, and here we face a paradox of our times. In a territorial sense, distances have shrunk enormously. Electronic communication and satellite transmission make it possible for the whole world to watch the Olympics or the Obama inauguration at the same time, and for friends in China and Argentina to talk to each other on the phone. One can communicate by e-mail with colleagues in Italy-hardly possible in the last days of Italian pre-electronic mail-and in Bangladesh. Existential distances, between races or ethnicities and between men and women, have also decreased. On the other hand, income and vital distances are increasing, in the world and in many, if not all, countries.
In the first half of the 1970s, the difference in life expectancy at birth between sub-Saharan Africa and high-income countries was 25.5 years; 30 years later, the difference was 30 years (6) . In the United Kingdom, the length-of-life gap between the rich and the poor has been increasing by 0.15 years annually since the 1980s (7). In metropolitan Glasgow, the gap is 28 years between males in Calton and males in Lenzie, larger than the gap between Africa and the United Kingdom in the 1970s. Glaswegians of Calton actually have a shorter life span than Australian Aborigines (8, 9) . Capitalist Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union are also falling behind. In the early 1970s Communist "stagnation," the life expectancy gap with high-income countries was 2.5 years; in the mid-2000s, the gap is almost 15 years (6) .
In terms of income, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in sub-Saharan Africa was about 8% of American GDP in 1973, but had fallen to 5% in 2005, as measured in terms of domestic purchasing power (5) . In the United States, the share of total household income appropriated by the richest 1% was 8% in 1980 and 17% in 2000. In the United Kingdom, the richest 1% leapt from receiving 6% of all income in 1980 to about 12.5% in 2000 (10) . In 1997-1998, the after-tax income at the 99th percentile in the United Kingdom (i.e., at the threshold to the richest 1%) was 10.2 times larger than that of the 10th percentile, i.e., at the top of the poorest 10% of the population. In 2006-2007, that gap had widened to 12.8 times (11) .
The gap between corporate executive pay and average workers' pay is now much wider than in pre-modern times. In 1688, British Baronets had an annual income about 100 times higher than that of laborers and out-servants and 230 times higher than that of cottagers and paupers. In 2007-2008, chief executives of the top Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 companies received a remuneration 141 times higher than the median income of all full-time employees in the United Kingdom and 236 times higher than people in "sales and customer service occupations" (5, 12, 13) . 1 Another angle from which to view the new economic distance is the current world distribution of wealth. In March 2008, before the bubble burst, Forbes magazine listed 1,125 of the world's billionaires. Together, they owned $4.4 trillion. That was almost the entire national income of 128 million Japanese or a third of the income of 302 million Americans.
Distantiation is the primary road to increasing inequality today. It is the most subtle of mechanisms and the most difficult to pin down morally and politically. Though its effects are highly visible in ostentatious consumption, it operates more through stealth than through assailable principles or blatant violations of human rights. Distantiation is a mechanism or a channel of inequality rather than a causal force. So what drives it?
Before going into that, it should be emphasized that distantiation is only exceptionally a product of particularly hard work or high merit. In fact, it is primarily governed by windows of opportunity and networks of contact, alternatively by negative pre-existing odds and social isolation.
Global vital distances have grown because some countries have fallen behind. Sub-Saharan Africa has seen its life expectancy drop because of AIDS, which for reasons still not fully understood-although clearly related to long-distance migration, sexual promiscuity, and poverty-has hit Africa harder than any other area of the planet. Russia and the former Soviet Union are victims of a ruthless restoration of capitalism that has caused massive unemployment, economic insecurity, impoverishment, and existential humiliation. The leading British epidemiologist Sir Michael Marmot, who has worked in Russia, has estimated the death toll from the 1990s capitalist restoration at about 4 million (4).
Inside rich countries, such as the United Kingdom, the growing life expectancy gap seems to be more an outcome of the privileged class' forward movement, greater openness to healthy lifestyle campaigns, and lower existential stress. It should be kept in mind, though, that the Whitehall study showed that the inverted status hierarchy of premature death persisted after controls for smoking, cholesterol, and other lifestyle indicators.
The global income gap increase is primarily an effect of Africa falling behind. But here the reasons are more obscure and contested than in the case of mortality. The continent-politically fragmented, disease-ridden, with weak logistical connections and without any strong proto-industrial traditions-has been severely handicapped from the start, heavily dependent on international commodity markets outside its control. The disruption of its political traditions by colonial partitions-turned-nation-states has provided the ground floor for a widely dysfunctional national politics. The impoverishment of the former Soviet Union and the decades of late 20th-century crises in Latin America have added to the global income picture.
Intra-national income gap widening, on the contrary, is driven primarily from the top. In the United States, but not in the United Kingdom, the soaring of the highest incomes in the last decade was accompanied by a slow decline of the income of the poorest fifth of the population. That the top is running ahead, rather than the poor falling behind, means that Asian and other low-wage competition is a minor component. Interestingly, the U-turn of income inequality is primarily an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon, most pronounced in the United States, but also marked in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. It is not a modern fatality, as it has not been followed in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland (10) .
What has driven the enormous widening of economic distances among people in recent decades? There seem to be two major processes at work.
One is the extension of solvent markets, which has increased both the pool of rewards and the competition for star talent. The lifting of controls on capital movements in the 1980s, the expansion of transnational investment, and the emergence of a global executive and professional market have catapulted a small business elite upwards, surfing on soaring stock markets. A similar phenomenon has occurred in sports and entertainment, which is increasingly referred to in apologetics of inequality. Commercial television and satellite broadcasting have transformed the economics of sports and entertainment. Hugely expanded audiences widen the visibility and attraction of stars, augment the remuneration pool, and increase profits. Entertainment capitalism and stardom need each other, symbiotically.
The second process is an autonomization of financial capitalism from what is still called "the real economy." In the last 10 years, this has turned capitalist finance into a gigantic gambling casino, trading in currencies, securities, and derivatives. The amount of nominal money involved has become astronomical. In early March 2009, the Asian Development Bank estimated that the value of financial assets in the world may have fallen in the current crisis by $50 trillion (14) , equal to the total value of world production in 2007. But as long as the balloon was ascending, the losers were few, and unless one was caught doing something outright illegal, one could be sure of being rewarded handsomely. The culture of bonuses rewarded immediate expansion, regardless of future losses.
It is noteworthy that at the same time as finance distanced itself from the rest of the economy, it moved closer to left-of-center politics (relatively speaking) in the United States and the United Kingdom. In the final stages of the most recent U.S. presidential campaign, conservative columnist David Brooks noted sadly in The New York Times that investment bankers were two-for-one in favor of Barack Obama. In the United Kingdom, the Blair-Brown governments have been happily surrounded by sympathetic City bankers. What do the high gamblers, New Democrats, and New Labour have in common? A common contempt of industrial society, with its working class collectivism and its bourgeois values of work, thrift, and respectability?
INEQUALITY, SO WHAT?
So, inequality is a fact and it is increasing. So what? As Tony Blair once implied as a reason for leaving income inequality untouched, does it matter if David Beckham earns much more than you do?
Inequality is a violation of human rights, and invoking celebrity pay is merely throwing smoke into one's eyes. Few people are likely to argue that a society that cuts 28 years of life from people in the most disadvantaged neighbourhood (Glasgow Calton) from those of the most privileged ones (Glasgow Lenzie, London Kensington, and Chelsea) is a decent society. Is it a vindication of the superiority of capitalism that male life expectancy in capitalist Russia is 17 years shorter than in Cuba (6)? Social status hierarchies are literally lethal. Why should the lowest rungs of Whitehall have a four times higher probability of dying before retirement age than the top rungs? The richest country on earth, the most unequal of the rich countries, the United States, has the third highest rate of relative poverty among 30 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries, after Mexico and Turkey. Relative poverty means exclusion from many parts of society's social and cultural life. The poorest tenth of the U.S. population has an income well below the OECD average and lower than the poorest tenth in Greece (15).
The turn of capitalist finance into a huge global casino is what created the current economic crisis, putting hundreds of thousands of people out of employment and demanding billions of pounds of taxpayers' money. In the South, the world crisis is bringing more poverty, hunger, and death. This effect of run-off distantiation is no longer defensible by referring to fans' infatuation and indulgence with their stars.
The stretch of social distance diminishes social cohesion, which in turn means more collective problems, like crime and violence, and fewer resources for solving all kinds of collective problems, from national identity to climate change. Western Europe, east of the British Isles, west of Poland, and north of the Alps, is still the world's least inegalitarian area. For an experience of the full power of inequalities, one should examine the violence and the fear of most South African and Latin American cities.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
While explicitly refusing the mantle of the politician or the prophet, there are a few things an expatriate scholar might venture to say.
Global inequality is, to a large extent, class and intra-state ethnic inequality, although in overall world statistics, international demarcations still have the upper hand in income inequality. Class and ethnicity are crucial. While overall income inequality is still governed by nation-state divisions, class and ethnic demarcations are cutting through them. We have learned intra-Glasgow inequality of life expectancy in the 2000s superseded the gap between the United Kingdom and sub-Saharan Africa in the 1970s. The international ratio between the richest nations, with 10% of world population, and the poorest countries was 39 in 2005. The 10/10 ratio between the classes was 48 in Brazil, 40 in Chile, and 33 in South Africa (6, 16) . "Globalization" is not a convincing excuse for inequality. Global equalization requires that the popular, disadvantaged forces of inegalitarian countries are strengthened.
Corresponding to mechanisms of inequality, there are mechanisms of equality, which already have been tried. The opposite of distantiation is rapprochement, whether by catching up or by compensating for handicaps. China and India are catching up after regaining national sovereignty around 1950, a crucial break of a half-century of stagnation, arguably more epochal than the turn to state-guided capitalism in China around 1978 and to capitalist liberalization in India around 1990. Inside countries, affirmative action in favor of scheduled castes and tribes in India, in favor of women from South Asia to the North Atlantic, and of African-Americans in the United States have been significant in reducing inequalities.
Inclusion has brought women into public space and labor markets in many parts of the globe. Recently, it has changed the Creole coloniality of some of the Amerindian republics of Latin America, particularly Bolivia and Ecuador. Defeats have been suffered in Guatemala (where the indigenous peoples are fragmented), Peru, and elsewhere. But the issue of how to include the "First Nations" into the polity of the 21st century remains on the agenda, from Chile to Canada. The European Union recently included an impoverished Eastern Europe into its area of prosperity.
In retrospect, the managerial de-hierarchization from the 1980s turns out to have been, in income, more a polarization between top and bottom, cutting out the middle, than a measure of equalization. Gains from post-hierarchical informalization should be expected, but hard evidence seems to be unavailable.
Redistribution and recompensation are powerful tools. Denmark and Sweden have the least income inequality (15). Both are heavily dependent on the world market, with merchandise export making up 35% of Danish Gross National Income and 40% of Swedish, as compared with 17% of the United Kingdom. The Danish welfare state spends 28% of GDP on social expenditure, the Swedish 31%, and the United Kingdom 20% (17). Marketeers will then ask, is this equality and generosity sustainable on the world market?
The irrefutable answer is yes. For many years, the Davos World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Reports have put the Scandinavian countries at the very top, over the United States and Switzerland. In the 2006-2008 editions, Denmark was ranked third in global competitiveness, with Sweden fourth in 2007-2008. New Labour Britain was ranked ninth, down from second in 2006-2007 (18) .
While these composite rankings should always be taken with a bit of skepticism, the success of the Nordic welfare states, with Finland ranked sixth and oil-rich Norway ranked 16th among 131 countries on a world capitalist list, does mean that generous, relatively egalitarian welfare states are neither utopias nor protected enclaves, but highly competitive participants in the world market.
